Case Study: Introducing Philosophy of Art in Eight Case Studies by Derek Matravers by Davor Pećnjak
Prolegomena 14 (1) 2015: 89–99
Case Study: Introducing Philosophy of Art in 
Eight Case Studies by Derek Matravers
DAVOR PEĆNJAK
Institute of Philosophy, Ulica grada Vukovara 54, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia 
davor@ifzg.hr
REVIEW ARTICLE / RECEIVED: 23/04/15 ACCEPTED: 14/05/15
ABSTRACT: In this review article, I present and discuss some theories and arguments 
which we can find in Derek Matravers’s (2013) opinonated textbook on the philoso-
phy of art. Texbook consists of an introduction and eight chapters, but only some of 
the most important claims are discussed: various theories and definitions of art, the 
notions of expression and value of art and artworks, as well as the question whether 
we can learn something from artworks, beside, of course, what is considered as artis-
tic and aesthetic. A little more emphasize I gave on the notions of forgeries and on 
the concept of beauty in connection with the artworks.
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This introduction into philosophy of art by Derek Matravers presents and 
considers some of the main philosophical problems about art and artworks in 
a novel, interesting and appropriate way (regarding that art is a philosophical 
object here): each chapter has one artwork as a pictorial leitmotiv1 on which 
various philosophical arguments and theories are tested!
I may add that this is also “opinionated” textbook – Matravers presents 
some of his own views and arguments about certain problems of the philoso-
phy of art and this gives me opportunity to say something what I would like 
1 Examples consist in seven paintings and one sculpture. Matravers explicitly says in 
the introduction “that focus will be on the visual arts, rather than on music, or literature, or 
even architecture (if architecture is an art).” Chapters are: 1. What is art? Yves Klein’s Anthro-
pometries; 2. The value of art: Lucian Freud’s Hotel Bedroom; 3. Expression: Mark Rothko’s 
Black on Maroon; 4. Forgeries, copies and variations: Gerhard Richter’s Dead 2; 5. Intention 
and interpretation: Loiuse Bourgeois’s Maman; 6. Beauty and ugliness: Francis Bacon’s Three 
Studies for Figures at the Base of a Crucifixion; 7. Art and knowledge: Edward Hopper’s Night-
hawks; 8. Art and morality: Balthus’s Therese Dreaming.
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to say about art on that basis, so I shall not, as may be usual, briefly present 
each and every theory and idea laid in his book, but I shall take some of the 
most interesting.
First chapter deals with the question “What is art?”. This question used 
to be one of the main philosophical concerns about the art. History of that 
question is rich with various answers and arguments in the search for a defi-
nition of art, or finding necessary and sufficient conditions to demarcate 
objects which are artworks from objects which are not. In difference from, for 
example, Carroll’s (1999) textbook, where details of various definitions and 
theories of “what is art” question are presented in many chapters, Matravers 
first offers a different and a new way: he confronts the “traditionalist” with 
the “radical”. “The traditionalist thinks that art is something like this: it takes 
skill to produce, it has to be worthwhile to experience, it has to be beautiful, 
and (possibly) it has to look like something(2). The radical will probably grant 
that what the traditionalist thinks is art is in fact art, but argue for a broader 
definition: that something can be art if it challenges us, if it extends bounda-
ries of art or, at the limit, if someone who is an artist, says that it is art” 
(Matravers 2013: 12). On that basis, not trying to reconcile these two views, 
or to try to defend one over the other, and after showing possible shortcom-
ings of both, Matravers offers the opinion that we perhaps invented the term 
“art” twice! Perhaps that could be so, but it opens the following possibility for 
which I would stand.
If we accept that the term “art” is invented twice (or, perhaps, even more 
times), then the second time, if the meaning of the second term differs in 
meaning and sense from the first, it means that what it denotes the second 
time is not what it denotes the first time of its use. So, what is termed “art” 
the second time in fact is not art – at least not that what it used to be meant 
under that term before the second “invention” (under understanding of the 
meaning which had been given first). Or, there are two different activities 
(and likewise, objects, that belong to these different activities or categories) 
that are art1 and art2 but these activities, though may be in some respects 
similar, are very far from being activities in the same sense.
Discussing proposal of the so-called aesthetic definition of art (Matravers 
considers it as an extension of the traditionalist definition) which would go 
2 Just for the accuracy: Painting which Matravers took as an example, popularly called 
Night Watch, is not quite a good example for the notion of what it captures what world looks 
like, because it certainly does not represents the night watch. The right title of the Rembrandt’s 
piece is The Parade of the Civic Guard under Captain F. Banning Cocq (1642, now in Rijks-
museum, Amsterdam). Whatever it does represent, and it seems that it has several layers of 
representation, happened during the day, and it is not an appearance of a night watch – see 
for example Bockemühl (2006: 49–57) and White (1984: 95–97). The false title Night Watch 
originated in 19th century.
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approximately like this – that x is an artwork iff x is made with the intention 
that it elicits special kind of experience, namely aesthetic experience; it is said 
that “[t]his would exclude nature because nature was not made by anyone 
and so not intended to be a certain way by anyone” (Matravers 2013: 14). 
This is not correct. God created the universe, so God created the nature. 
Therefore, if God has an intention, besides creating the nature with the in-
tention for nature to provide for the life of intelligent soul-having creatures as 
human beings are, that nature cause aesthetic experiences in human beings, 
then nature is an artwork also. It is an artwork created by God. So we can say 
that God is both an “engineer” and “artist”. But, of course, aesthetic defini-
tion could work well if we consider only human dwellings, because in that 
sense no human being had made the nature.
I am not inclined to defend “aesthetic definition” of art but I would 
like to say also the following. As Matravers presents, on the other hand, it 
could seem that such an aesthetic definition is too broad (Matravers 2013: 
15) since it would include many objects that nobody would classify as art. 
For example, it will include good looking motorbikes, cars or some domestic 
apparatuses. But when we say that they are works of art we do not mean 
it literally. Toasters, refrigerators or motorbikes are not artworks. Still, how 
they look sometimes provokes a kind of experience of which we would say 
that it is “aesthetic experience”. So, what should we say? Matravers says that 
certain defender of such a definition could “bite the bullet” (a very desperate 
measure, indeed!), or to refine definition and to say that primary intention 
of an object is to elicit and cause aesthetic experience. Primary intention of 
a toaster is to toast the bread, of cars to move people and goods around. So 
they would not be artworks. But what about an appearance of a toaster or a 
car? It seems that it is not a primary function of an appearance of a toaster to 
toast the bread, but of the toaster as a whole. So, I would say that primary 
intention of an appearance of a good looking toaster or motorbike is to sell it 
better (because of that, good looking which provokes “aesthetic” experience 
has ultimate function in selling the good, but in proper art, provoking aes-
thetic experience is an end in itself; it is, in a way, ultimate).
On that basis we can perhaps say that part of an object can be an art-
work, so design of a toaster can be an artwork and not the whole toaster – be-
cause primary function of a toaster is to toast the bread. This functionality 
is wrapped in something that is (perhaps) an artwork – so only part of that 
object, in metaphysical sense – just a apart of a toaster – is an artwork.
This idea could be, perhaps, also useful, even regardless of any definition 
of art, how to regard architecture. Buildings and houses have many functions 
– and the primary function is to enable people to live and work in them or 
to produce something or store goods. But buildings and houses also have an 
outer layers and are situated somewhere in space. Appearance of a building 
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is (sometimes, at least) made primarily with the intention to elicit aesthetic 
response, so this kind of primary intention for making an appearance of a 
building could make a building an artwork; better to say again that part of a 
building is an artwork – its appearance only, its outer layer, not its functional-
ity and internal divisions according to functionality of that house or building, 
for example.
After discussing various implications of various theories and definitions 
of art, including Dickie’s and Levinson’s, who tried to “formalize” some kind 
of a modernist approach and then to apply it also to traditional concept of 
art (in order to embrace all art), so they come with what is known as “Insti-
tutional theory of art” and “Historical theory of art” respectively, Matravers 
concludes, agreeing with Lopes (2008, 2014), that perhaps searching for a 
ultimate definition of all art is fruitless and that more pay-off could be gained 
from considering some work or works and try to say to which art form they 
belong (if any) and in that way make sense of them.
In the second chapter, Matravers considers the notion of value in con-
nection with art. Why the artworks are valuable for us or in what their value 
consists in? Things, generally, can have an instrumental value, when they 
serve to attain something beside them, or they can have an intrinsic value 
when they are considered themselves as an “end”. So, in the case of painting, 
which Matravers considers, the right question about artistic value is, what is 
valuable in a painting as a painting. After considering painting as a source 
of information, as a kind of decoration of certain spaces (walls in rooms, 
restaurants etc.) and some other possibilities, showing that these are instru-
mental values of paintings, Matravers proposes (as he himself says, following 
Budd 1995) that real value of paintings as paintings lies in non-instrumental 
valuable experience of a painting, where the base of that experience is in an 
understanding of the painting (Matravers 2013: 41). Of course, one of the 
most important aspects of the experience of the painting is how it looks. But, 
according to Matravers, this is not all: according to how painting looks and 
what is, thus, depicted, we can describe it and give reasons for such a doing. 
Matravers’s discussion shows that value of paintings, and value of artworks in 
general, is not an instrumental value, but “it is a non-instrumental value of 
the experience of the work that would be had by someone that understands 
the work” (Matravers 2013: 49). That sounds very much plausible, but just 
in passing (and, seemingly, from the point of view of the more “traditionalist” 
view of the art), I would like to pose question for much contemporary art. It 
seems to me that we can legitimately ask whether there is something, or even 
anything at all, for understanding?!
Take many modern and contemporary abstract paintings for example. 
When we look at abstract patches, we can see whatever we want or are associ-
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ated by – and so do critics in fact many times when explaining abstract and 
contemporary art. There is no solid points on which we can test what we say 
when we describe amorphous patches of color or masses in contemporary 
abstract paintings and sculptures. We imagine that we see something in them 
and that they have some overt or hidden further sense and meaning, and 
many times it is not there, so there is no right understanding of contemporary 
paintings or sculptures. It is just, most of the time just (I dare to say, wrong), 
imagination. Take Carroll’s (1999: 148) example that artists sometimes, in 
making their works, “make choices willy-nilly with no idea where they are 
headed … because [they] [have] no sense at all where the work is going”. If 
this is true description of how some works are made, then I would say that it 
is close to nothing; there should be no understanding of this “work” because 
there is literally nothing – so nothing is present for understanding. If a critic 
says that “work” is about F, then he does not understand it. Because it is not 
about F. It would not be about anything.
If it can be shown that for some works there is nothing to understand, 
then question arises whether there could be artworks with no value at all or 
are they in fact not artworks; does lacking of the right features deprives such 
“works” of the ontological status of art(works)? Well, I would say “yes” for 
such a case.
Chapter three deals with the notion of expression. The question is how 
artworks can be expressive, e.g. how can they contain, elicit or transfer feel-
ings or emotional states. Artworks, like paintings, sculptures or musical 
compositions, etc., are, of course, not psychological subjects, so they can-
not literally have (contain, or be in) emotional states. But many times we 
describe artworks, and it seems correctly, as being merry, joyful, mysterious, 
sad, threatening, hilarious etc. In what sense they are so, then? Matravers 
considers several possible answers. One possible answer is given by the so-
called arousalism: we describe the paintings with certain emotional terms cor-
rectly, if and only if the standard viewer feels that emotion or feeling, upon 
contemplating and considering a painting with an appropriate understand-
ing (Matravers 2013: 57). I think that sometimes precisely this is the case, 
but generally speaking, I agree that this answer will not do: as it is said, it is 
only sometimes the case; moreover, we describe the paintings (or other kinds 
of artworks) themselves (as objects) as hilarious or fearful or… etc., though 
we know that they are not literally such, but we still hold that there is some-
thing in them that makes them to be described as such, and we do not report 
just what real emotional state the viewer is in. The second possible answer 
also will not do because it goes like this: the standard viewer experiences the 
painting as resembling a person who, in standard circumstances, looks as if 
he or she is in a certain emotional state (Matravers 2013: 58). It won’t do as 
a general answer because many paintings, for which we put some emotional 
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concepts in describing them, do not resemble persons at all, even if some 
of them contain depicted persons! Some finer graining should be given as 
Lopes (2005: chapter 2) helps clarifying the issues: if there are specifically 
depicted persons manifesting feelings or emotions, on a certain painting, we 
can attribute an expression to these depicted persons (figure expression); we 
can attribute an expression to the scene which is painted, at least partly, and 
not to the persons on this very same painting, if it contains persons (scene 
expression). Since there are paintings that are abstract and non-figurative, that 
depict neither persons nor scenes, there is an expression that we can attribute 
to overall design and surface (design expression). There can be some problems 
with these ways, as Lopes and Matravers warn,3 but even the very multiplicity 
of such different ascriptions show that there is no unique way of attributing 
an expression; so we have no satisfying general explanation and answer to our 
starting question. After considering a few other possibilities, showing that 
they, too, cannot give general answer, Matravers (2013: 63) concludes that 
there is no philosophically general answer to our question – in fact, question 
is the wrong one! There are many different ways what we do when we ascribe 
expressions to paintings and other artworks. I would like to add that I think, 
for one reason, that different ways of ascribing expressions to artworks stems 
from the relatively vague meanings of emotional terms. “Joy”, for example, as 
well as many other emotional states, can be felt in many different ways, even 
to the one and the same person. We are not joyful always in the same way, 
and do not feel it the same way, but still in many occasions we are correctly 
described as “joyful”. If we cannot say about ourselves in a precise and differ-
entiating way what exactly it means when we describe ourselves in expressive 
manner, as beings who literally have and are in these emotional states, all dif-
ficulties for describing (art) objects as expressive, start here.
Chapter four discusses forgeries and duplicates. This is a very interesting 
subject both concerning art and the philosophy of art.4 Questions interest-
ing for the philosophy of art about forgeries are not of moral nature (fraud is 
fraud, of course) but what kind of works are forgeries; do they have aesthetic 
properties at all; and if they do, what aesthetic or artistic properties they 
have, and do they have a(n) (artistic) value at all? Moreover, can copies and 
3 Very good and nice examples, among others, are chosen: Bruegel’s The Glooomy Day 
(1565) in which persons depicted are not at all gloomy, but just the atmosphere depicted 
seems so; van Gogh’s Wheatfield with Crows (1890) – for example, you could never confront 
such a field and sky in reality; the main example of the chapter is Rothko’s Black on Maroon 
(1958) which is non-figurative and abstract painting described by a critic David Sylvester as 
“intimate, repelling, menacing”. About these and other Bruegel’s and van Gogh’s paintings you 
may wish to consult Hagen & Hagen (2007) and Walther (2006).
4 For good art historical presentations about forgeries, copies and copying, see Hoving 
(1997) and Lenain (2011); collection of articles about philosophical problems of forgeries is 
Dutton (1983). 
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forgeries be valuable as originals? Forgeries are works which are presented as 
being of different maker than the actual maker; they are presented as having 
a different origin than the actual one. Forgeries can be of two kinds: they 
can be copies of existing works but presented as if they are originals; or they 
can be, in fact, new works, but done in the style and manner of a certain 
(famous) artist and presented as if they are originals of that artist and not of 
their actual maker. First of all, there is nothing wrong about copies if they are 
made for exercise or for the pleasure of the copyist and if they are claimed as 
being copies. But what is a relation between an exact copy and the original? 
Is the original always more valuable, more significant or can a copy have the 
same value as an original? Matravers asks us to imagine that in some place in 
the middle of the nowhere, people decide that from the sales of their local 
artist buy a machine which can (re)produce 100% exact copies of the master-
works of great past masters. Copies will be exact to the smallest details (they 
will be perfect copies), they will be non-differentiable from the originals. 
Would they be worth as originals? Consider these two thoughts that aim to 
show that even exact copies would not be valuable as originals: in copying, a 
copy machine puts marks of the lines and colors on the board or canvas, and 
not an artist, as in a usual case of making a painting. The second thought, 
following the former, is that an artist makes something new when making 
an original painting, but copy (analytically!) is a copy of something already 
existing; and, starting from blank, the original finished work depends exactly 
on how it was made by its maker, though a copy depends on the mechanical 
process of reproduction. Regarding the first, Matravers points that the fact 
that original was in direct causal contact with an artist is only a mere histori-
cal connection with a maker and that it does not in the slightest change how 
the painting looks. Because how painting looks is its aesthetic and artistic 
value and because a perfect copy does not have a single difference in how it 
looks, compared to the original, perfect copy would be artistically valuable 
in the same way as an original. Regarding the second objection, Matravers 
retorts that a perfect copy also depends on how the maker of the original 
made the original – because a copy machine reproduces and makes a copy 
exactly (causally depending on) how the original looks and it looks that way 
because an artist made it so! So, copy depends also on how the maker made 
its original. Because of that, a perfect copy is no less valuable than the origi-
nal: “What is of interest in the painting – the appearance – would also survive 
from copy to copy” (Matravers 2013: 76).
What about the forgeries which are not copies of existing works (and so 
in a way they are originals!) but purported to pose as being works of some-
body else (but not of actual maker)? Can they be valuable as originals? After 
we discover that certain painting is a forgery, that very same painting stays the 
same in the way it looks as before. If we admired it, why we should stop ad-
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miring it just because we put another label of the name of a maker, and noth-
ing else (changed in the looks of the painting)? Matravers presents several 
possible responses of which I shall consider two most significant. Works of art 
are considered in relations one to another, so forgeries would be also consid-
ered in such a way. It means that they also influence how we consider the rest 
of the paintings in the world of art, and forgeries thus may distort our correct 
knowledge and points of view about the artist to which a forgery is attributed 
to, to entire styles or even the whole periods in the history of art. This is a 
reason why this second kind (they are often “pastiches”) of forgeries are, then, 
not valuable as originals, regardless of the way how they look (to audience). 
Though most of the time what is said will be true, I think that there is a possi-
ble case in which even such a kind of forgery can be as valuable as an original. 
We can imagine – because it is, first of all, logically possible – that a forger 
produced a work which would be produced exactly – 100 percent the same 
– by the artist in the past to which it is falsely attributed;5 or, if not exactly the 
same to the last detail, let’s say that forgery has and bears (all and) only those 
attributes, properties and means which would be used by the original artist. 
Let’s say that this work-forgery conforms perfectly to the style and oeuvre of 
the old master, period and style. Then nothing would be changed signifi-
cantly in our understanding of this old master artist, the period in which he 
worked or his style. After all, that old master himself could have produced one 
more Last Supper or Christ Blessing the Children. I think it is better to have 
one more beautiful and good work then just a true cold fact that a painter A 
painted seven Last Suppers instead of eight for example. Of course, counting a 
forgery in this way would not be true to the (historical) facts, but it seems to 
me that we would have more valuable things in the world, which overrides in 
value the value of having exact truth about the history of art.
Beauty is a concept most tightly connected with the art. It is no easy to 
say what is beauty and what is beautiful, but we intuitively expect artworks to 
be beautiful. Rightly so, in my opinion. Matravers, in chapter six, after stating 
that ordinary language usage of “beautiful” is too unsystematic, offers that we 
should use the term “beautiful” (concerning art) for something “that presents 
pleasing experience that is valuable” (2013: 107). For the philosophy of art, 
question is then, whether something that does not have a pleasing appear-
5 Consider the following possible case: a forgery attributed to Tizian. It is logically pos-
sible that someone could make a painting which is in each and every detail such as it would be 
if Tizian himself had painted it – so it would be better to have at least one more such (excellent 
and beautiful) painting in the world even if it is forged, than we have true Tizians. We would 
have more beautiful and valuable things in the world because it would be certain that people 
would enjoy one painting more and nothing would be distorted about real Tizian’s style, oeu-
vre, manner, etc. Of course, it is not that the more, the better, in each case (more wars, for 
example would have been worse), but in the cases as such, it would be!
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ance (and is perhaps ugly) nevertheless has a valuable appearance. Matravers 
would say that if this is possible, then that work nevertheless has “aesthetic 
merit”. He argues positively for such a standpoint and, as an example, he 
uses Bacon’s Three Studies for Figures at the Base of a Crucifixion (1944, now 
in Tate Gallery, London) Without much argument, I admit, I would say that 
it is questionable whether works that are not beautiful, or at least “pretty”6 
have aesthetic and artistic merit or whether they are artworks at all. Namely, 
I think that one of the functions of art or its intrinsic “ground” is exactly to 
present, whatever it presents, in a beautiful manner, or in as much pretty or 
beautiful manner it can. Surely there is no limit (except decency and moral-
ity) what art can take as an object or its content about what it would like to 
say something or present (in some way something), but the very nature of 
art is so, in my opinion, that even violent or cruel things can be presented 
in a “pretty” or beautiful way. If these things which are presented are by 
themselves (as real things or event in the world) unpleasant or ugly, why the 
(art)work which presents them should be unpleasant or ugly too? We witness 
that many violent (and so, in fact, ugly) scenes (throughout history of art) are 
presented in gracious and beautiful way without losing sense and meaning 
about what these works (their authors) would like to say about these objects 
or events. Just for an example take some paintings of Artemisia Gentileschi,7 
but we can find many more examples. What I would like to say is that these 
examples, whatever they depict, they depict their contents more or less beau-
tifully and they try always to extract something positively as a morals or “true 
meaning and a message” of that artwork, even from bad and ugly events they 
portray. So, it can be done without artworks being ugly as Bacon’s definitely 
are, not to mention some other (contemporary) artists or groups of artists. 
I am aware that it is still a long way from saying that lacking property of 
beauty, or even at least property of some kind of valuable prettiness, to show 
that this lacking perhaps would disqualify works from being artworks at all, 
but I would be prepared to go along this way.
Chapter seven considers the question whether art can deliver knowl-
edge. The meaning of this question is, of course, whether art can deliver 
new knowledge, something that we did not know before we contemplated a 
certain artwork (and, of course, new knowledge apart from aesthetic, artistic 
and art historical matters). It seems that it can. Contemplating Nighthawks 
6 Matravers says, and I agree, that there is a difference between works that are pretty and 
that are beautiful. Beautiful works have much more aesthetic value and aesthetic merit than 
works that are “merely” pretty. There is a kind of continuum between pretty and beautiful (see 
Matravers 2013: 105–17)
7 Paintings as Judith Slaying Holofernes (1614–1620, now in Ufizzi, Florence) or Judith 
and her Maidservant (1614, now in Palazo Pitti, Florence).
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(1942, now in Art Institute of Chicago), a painting by the American realist 
Edward Hopper, it is suggested that we can say, on the basis of the content of 
that painting, that the life in big cities is alienating and that bars may serve as 
refuges from the dark and unpleasant outside world (Matravers 2013: 118). 
But many would say that this kind of “knowledge” is only banal knowledge, 
it is a triviality and it is something we already knew before, and that art is 
not capable to provide beyond this kind of knowledge. Art is not capable to 
provide people with new beliefs in the sense as (factual) knowledge is, more 
or less, justified true belief. One answer is that perhaps art can “sharpen” our 
already acquired knowledge, if not capable to give new knowledge. But to be 
so, artworks should be reliable and trustworthy sources about worldly mat-
ters. Then, the question is what it means to say that we have to judge whether 
artworks are reliable and trustworthy in this sense. If we have these means, 
that would mean that we, again, already knew what the artwork in question 
would like to deliver as knowledge or if we can not judge its reliability, then 
the possibility of getting real new knowledge from artworks is in great jeop-
ardy! But, artworks are not objects designed primarily to deliver knowledge 
in the sense we have of acquiring new knowledge from textbooks or from 
science. For artworks to be what they are and to be successful, they need to 
appeal as works of art (Matravers 2013: 119). But there is no link between the 
properties of the work for which they are appealing, and the truth (because 
knowledge is, as is said above, more or less, justified true belief, so truth 
should be tracked). Sometimes they can be linked, sometimes not. Perhaps 
artworks can deliver knowledge only in a secondary sense, as auxiliary devices 
– when we have a common system of symbols, means of representations etc., 
so these many elements can be combined in artworks, in many ways, but 
because they are common both to producers of art and their consumers, 
some combination that is never seen before can be “read off ” and so some 
new knowledge (apart from artistic, aesthetic and art historical matters) can 
be gained because the system is known, as in a natural language. Or, some-
one has to tell first something about the artwork to catch its full content and 
meaning and then it can, perhaps, teach us something new. Of course, this 
would then be only instrumental property or value of an artwork.
But I would agree that artworks are not objects designed to deliver new 
knowledge just by themselves and that they are mostly incapable of doing that 
just by themselves – but this is not any kind of fault for artworks.
For a brief conclusion I would like to say that as a textbook, Matravers’s 
book is, no doubt, overwhelmingly useful, but, as I hope that this review tes-
tifies, we can also find many innovative proposals for serious further discus-
sion about the important matters concerning art and the philosophy of art.8
8 I would like to thank the Library Committee of the Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, as 
well as Branko and Renata Pećnjak.
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